Paul Krugman's essay "Who Was Milton Friedman?" seriously mischaracterizes Friedman's economics and his legacy. In this paper we provide a rejoinder to Krugman on these issues. In the course of setting the record straight, we provide a self-contained guide to Milton Friedman's impact on modern monetary economics and on today's central banks. We also refute the conclusions that Krugman draws about monetary policy from the experiences of the United States in the 1930s and of Japan in the 1990s.
Introduction
Paul Krugman's essay "Who Was Milton Friedman?" (Krugman, 2007a) seriously mischaracterizes Friedman's economics and his legacy as well as the legacy of monetarism. 1 Krugman also mischaracterizes monetary policy in the United States in the 1930s and in Japan in the 1990s. In this paper we provide a rejoinder to Krugman on these issues. In the course of setting the record straight, we provide a self-contained guide to Milton Friedman's main contributions to monetary policy debates and a picture of his impact on the policies of today's central banks.
We begin this rejoinder by summarizing Krugman's principal misstatements regarding Friedman's body of work and its influence on monetary policy formulation today. Krugman indulges in inaccurate forays into economic history by attributing the depth and duration of the U.S. Great Depression in the 1930s and Japan's extended slump in the 1990s to a liquidity trap, and giving an incorrect picture of the impact of monetarism on monetary policy (Section 1).
In Section 2, we trace the development of Friedman's ideas on inflation, beginning with the record of his opposition to the macroeconomic policies pursued in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. We also briefly review Friedman's role in theoretical debates on inflation.
We highlight differences between the views of Keynesians and those of Friedman. Friedman rejected both the cost-push and the simple Phillips curve approaches that were emblematic of Keynesian 1970s inflation analysis. We then describe the steps leading to Friedman's modifications of the simple Phillips curve and his criticism of Keynesian "patched-up" versions of the Phillips curve.
We next turn to the 1970s debates about price controls as the means of reducing inflation, and show that Krugman's (2007b) statements about the 1970s debate on controls in his reply to our criticisms exhibited further misunderstanding of the importance of monetarist debates and the contribution of monetarism.
We contrast Friedman's view on incomes policies to those of his leading Keynesian opponents (including James Tobin, Paul Samuelson, Arthur Okun, and Walter Heller) . 1 Krugman's essay appeared in The New York Review of Books on February 15, 2007. Our Letter to the Editor in response to the essay, limited to 750 words by the magazine's rules, and a reply by Krugman, appeared in the March 29, 2007 issue (Schwartz and Nelson, 2007; Krugman, 2007b) . Our response dealt only with some obvious inaccuracies in the essay although it alluded to questionable perspectives on technical economic issues in Krugman's commentary. Apart from the space limitations the periodical imposed, The New York Review of Books is not an appropriate forum for a discussion of these issues. This rejoinder serves that purpose.
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We show that Krugman's assertion that opposition to price controls was common ground among monetarists and non-monetarists is incorrect.
Sections 3 to 5 then discuss Friedman's further influences on modern monetary policy thinking.
In Section 6, we refute Krugman's claims that a liquidity trap characterized monetary policy in the Great Depression in the United States in the 1930s and in Japan in the 1990s. For
Krugman it is enough to note that short-term nominal interest rates are close to or at the zero bound to designate the two episodes as examples of a liquidity trap. He neglects an investigation of the actual motivations of the policymakers involved, and so the factors that account for the policies they adopted; he also understates the scope that was available for achieving a successful monetary expansion.
We conclude the paper in Section 7 with remarks on the credibility of Krugman's portrayal of Milton Friedman. To some readers, Krugman's willingness to praise Friedman despite these accusations might indicate that his essay is balanced; but to us, it shows the degree to which the essay consists of doubletalk. Krugman's accusations constitute such fundamental criticisms that, if accurate, they should be sufficient to rule out a favorable conclusion about Friedman.
Krugman's misstatements in "Who
Specifically: How can he say Friedman was a great economist and a great man, if he believes Friedman to have been intellectually dishonest? Or argue that Friedman was a man of courage, if he misled people?
b. On Monetarism
According to Krugman, the generally successful monetary policies observed in the United States and other countries since the 1980s amount to an unambiguous defeat for Friedman and monetarism. Krugman's discussion is confused to say the least-for example, in treating Friedman's work on inflation as separate from his work on monetary theory and policy.
Krugman does certainly create the clear impression that monetary policy since the 1980s constitutes a return to the pre-Friedman, pre-monetarism status quo.
2 But the last 20 years have not seen a return in the United States and other countries to the wage-price guideposts and wageprice controls of the 1960s and 1970s; nor have they been characterized by anything other than wide acceptance of Friedman's position that controls and guideposts were ineffective ways to fight inflation. Replacement of these failed measures with arrangements in which central banks accept responsibility for inflation control, is a major legacy of Friedman and of monetarism-a legacy which Krugman (2007a) , in attempting to press his case that "monetarism is now widely regarded as a failure," overlooks. 
… ever since then [1984] the Fed has engaged in precisely the sort of discretionary fine-tuning that Friedman decried" (Krugman, 2007a) . 3 For relevant statements, see Bernanke (2006) , Greenspan (1997) , Issing, Gaspar, Angeloni, and Tristani (2001, Ch. 1) , and the quotation from Mervyn King in The Guardian (November 17, 2006) .
A recent evaluation of the contribution of monetarism by Michael Woodford (2007, p. 3) notes accurately that "monetarism established that monetary policy can do something about inflation, and that the central bank can reasonably be held accountable for controlling inflation."
This evaluation is inconsistent with Krugman's dismissal of monetarism.
In his reply to us, Krugman (2007b) objects that "to say that central banks now take responsibility for inflation is a long way from saying that monetarism has succeeded." But
Krugman himself is on record as saying the following in a 1999 talk (Krugman, 1999) :
We live in the Age of the Central Banker…Through much of the world, quasi-independent central banks are now entrusted with the job of steering economies between the rocks of inflation and the whirlpool of deflation. Their judgment is often questioned, but their power is not… we have all become sort-of monetarists… Krugman (2007b) confirms that he indeed embraces the extreme Keynesian answers to these questions-he believes that the central bank was largely powerless to raise the money stock, and that, if achieved, monetary expansion would
Krugman's 1999 remarks are downloadable from the internet (see our bibliography). A published version has also appeared (Krugman, 2000) . 5 Krugman's (2007a Krugman's ( , 2007b position about the power of monetary policy is more negative than the position advanced in his early work on Japan (e.g., Krugman, 1998) . In that early work he was already applying the label "liquidity trap" to Japan, but was nevertheless proposing monetary policy actions to revive the Japanese economy.
not have revived the economy. We argue the contrary case in Section 6, while also taking the opportunity to correct Krugman's misstatements about Friedman's work on the Great Depression. Prior to that discussion, however, we consider the contributions of Friedman and monetarism to monetary theory and policymaking (Sections 2 to 5).
Milton Friedman's position on inflation
In this section, we provide a perspective on Friedman's role in debates on inflation in the 1960s and 1970s. But as background for this discussion, we start with a brief review of his participation in theoretical debates. This review highlights the differences between his views and those of Keynesians. This allows us to bring out the corresponding differences between
Friedman and Keynesians on policy issues in the 1970s. Our review of these debates establishes that Krugman (2007b) is incorrect to claim that opposition to price controls was common ground among monetarists and Keynesians. Our discussion of more recent developments emphasizes that the contemporary shift to inflation-oriented monetary policies reflects the influence of Friedman and monetarism.
Keynesian economics and inflation
And if price-levels are determined by money-costs, it follows that whilst an 'appropriate' quantity of money is a necessary condition of stable prices, it is not a sufficient condition. John Maynard Keynes (1943, p. 185 The successive Keynesian positions were: (i) that inflation was a cost-push phenomenon independent of demand pressure (at least until output reached its full-employment level); and (ii) the early Phillips-curve position, according to which inflation did depend on demand pressure, but a menu of trade-off choices existed, whereby higher inflation could permanently buy lower unemployment. We consider Friedman's characterization and critique of each of these positions, before considering his own view of the inflation process.
Friedman's characterization of the Keynesian view of inflation. Friedman (1953a, p. 118) characterized the Keynesian view of price-level behavior as follows: prices were insensitive to increases or decreases in nominal aggregate demand so long as output remained below its fullemployment level; once output attained its full-employment position, on the other hand, prices absorbed any further increase in nominal aggregate demand. He later described the rigid-pricelevel assumption as "the distinctive feature" of Keynesian economics (Friedman, 1972a, p. 906) , prominent both in the work of "Keynes himself, and his American followers even more" (Friedman and Schwartz, 1982, p. 426). 6 According to Friedman's characterization, while Keynesian analysis did acknowledge that price fluctuations occurred while output was below its full-employment value, it did not treat these fluctuations endogenously. 7 Rather, as Friedman put it, prices and the inflation rate were treated as an "institutional datum." 8 In particular, variations in inflation were attributed to exogenous cost-push forces. Friedman emphasized that the view of inflation as cost-push was a form of Keynesian analysis which particularly received support from Keynes' General Theory (1936) . A markup equation for prices, "link[ing] prices to costs, mainly wages," with costs autonomously determined, was "derivable from Keynes' system, " 9 and the treatment of inflation as cost-push was "more general [than the price-rigidity assumption] and perhaps more consistent with the spirit rather than the letter of Keynes' analysis." 10 This characterization of Keynes (1936) was challenged in Friedman's 1972 debate with his critics, with Friedman (1972a, p. 906) noting that three of his five critics disputed his Friedman (1977, p. 469) noted that the Phillips curve approach seemingly "filled a gap in Keynes' theoretical structure" by adding inflation to the list of endogenous variables.
See Harrod (1951) . Readers of Keynes (1943) will also find unmistakable support for Friedman's characterization of Keynes' views. 12 See Friedman (1972a, Appendix 2, point 9) , and Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 49) . 13 In addition, unlike early Keynesian work in which full employment corresponded to maximum feasible employment, Phillips curve analysis was more flexible by allowing for the possibility of positive output gaps (i.e., overfull employment), as Friedman (1976a, p. 218) noted. Friedman (1968 Friedman ( , 1977 instead proposed a different modification, which still admitted a long-run interpretation of the equation as a real wage equation. This proposal was to view the Phillips curve as describing the evolution of perceived real wage growth: for example, Δw t -E t−1 Δp t . Underlying this modified Phillips curve was the idea that contracts for nominal wages were negotiated conditional on last period's expectation of this period's price Friedman (1975, p. 176) . 15 Here w t is the log of the nominal wage index in period t, and Δ is the first difference operator. 16 See Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 50 
Friedman's view of inflation
The expectations-augmented Phillips curve simultaneously allows for a short-run inflation/unemployment relation for a given natural rate of unemployment (more precisely, a {Δp t , u t -u t *} relation); as well as the long-run absence of such a relationship, with u t invariably reverting to the natural unemployment rate u t * irrespective of the maintained inflation rate. Phelps (1967 Phelps ( , 1968 provided modifications to the Phillips curve that paralleled and overlapped with Friedman's proposals.
Though an explicit augmented-expectations Phillips curve was not written down in Friedman (1968 ) (appearing, however, in Friedman, 1970a , and Friedman and Schwartz, 1982 , the discussion in Friedman (1968) provided a basic underpinning for subsequent developments of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve and the natural rate hypothesis, including rational expectations models with nominal price or wage stickiness such as those in Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1980) . That influence continues to be reflected in the modern literature that incorporates nominal price contracts into a dynamic general equilibrium environment. An early study in this literature, King and Wolman (1996) , noted the common themes with those advanced by Friedman, and the authors listed five elements which meant that their "model is monetarist."
These included the presence of temporary price stickiness, which implied "short-run nonneutrality of money with long-run neutrality," an implication they noted was "in line with the perspective of Schwartz (1963a, 1963b) ." The authors further observed that their model implied an "emphasis on expectations... in the tradition of Irving Fisher and Milton
Friedman" (King and Wolman, 1996, pp. 83−84) . Friedman (1977, p. 469) further criticized Keynesian economics for using "patched-up versions" of the Phillips curve that added explanatory variables, but did not make the vital modification of including expected inflation with a unit coefficient. Starting with Phillips (1958) and Samuelson and Solow (1960) , subscribers to a simple Phillips curve had tried to explain deviations from the curve by appeal to cost-shifting variables such as import prices or labor Friedman's (1968, p. 10) terminology for the price level relevant to the wage decision was the "earlier price level," but a more precise terminology, and one consistent with our use of E t−1 Δp t in the text, would be "the previous period's expectation of the current price level." Such an interpretation is consistent with Friedman's (1977, p. 457) statement that the "perceived future average price" enters nominal wage agreements. 18 As in traditional Phillips curve analysis, ξ u < 0, to ensure that inflation responds to excess demand and supply. union pressure. In Friedman's view, as an empirical matter, a simple Phillips curve augmented by these additional explanatory variables was not an adequate substitute for the expectationsaugmented Phillips curve; and as a theoretical matter, adding these extra variables brought in cost-push factors as supplementary explanations of inflation, and so actually went back in the direction of treating prices as an institutional datum.
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Policy debates on wage and price controls in the 1970s
Friedman's analysis of inflation in the 1970s reflected his theoretical views. He diagnosed the inflation problem in the United States and elsewhere as "excess demand" due to monetary ease. 20 He completely rejected wage and price controls as a solution, for several interrelated reasons. One of these was traditional: controls did not genuinely remove inflationary pressure but simply meant that price signals were suppressed, creating shortages, or had to be transmitted in a less efficient way, such as via quality changes. This line of argument paralleled the criticism of wartime price controls in Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, p. 557 ).
Friedman's remaining arguments against controls reflected the circumstances of the 1970s policy debate and his reaction to it. Cost-push theories were being revived as an explanation of U.S. inflation, and incomes policies (i.e., some variant of wage and price controls)
proposed as the ideal way of fighting this inflation. Friedman continued to reject cost-push as a credible source of sustained inflationary pressure: he knew of no postwar episode explicable by cost-push (Friedman, 1966) , while the 1970s inflation was attributable to past monetary expansion, not wage-push (Friedman, 1972b) . Therefore, he saw no justification for incomes policy. Controls and other actions on specific prices would transfer inflationary pressure to those items in the price index not subject to control. With inflation due to excess demand, controls were counterproductive: not only did they take attention away from the genuine cure, which was reduced pressure on demand; by virtue of their perceived status as a distinct tool against inflation, incomes policies actually gave policymakers more reason to pursue expansion of aggregate demand. Keynesians during the 1970s, as we will now show.
James Tobin. Tobin noted that a major difference on inflation policy between himself and
Friedman was in their attitudes to incomes policies: [Friedman] will not entertain wage and price controls or other incomes policies as alternatives or complements to anti-inflationary monetary restrictions… If they [i.e., monetarists] triumph, democratic capitalist economies will suffer high unemployment and slow real growth for some years to come. (Tobin, 1976.) Tobin was therefore an advocate of incomes policies to fight inflation. He saw cost-push as a distinct source of inflation, and one requiring direct measures: "if the real wages and profits demanded for producing output add up to more than the output produced, we will have to inject more competition, or alternatively control a la guideposts, into the setting of prices and wages." (Tobin, 1966, p. 12.) In principle, At the beginning of the Nixon Administration there were indications that the new Council and other top economists were taking a monetarist line… But events, common sense, and politics have prevailed… The New Economics lives after all. (Tobin, 1974, p. 70.) -
Similarly, in testimony to Congress in September 1971, Tobin said, "The more stimulus that occurs during the wage-price freeze the better… Now the Fed should engineer a reduction in interest rates to aid the expansion…" (September 9, 1971 , testimony, in Joint Economic Committee, 1971a . He added that "the freeze must be followed by guideposts." (Ibid, p.
377).
In fact, Tobin advocated monetary and demand management policies for the United
States over the 1970s that were even more expansionary than those actually followed. In
February 1977 he recommended that the Fed "lower significantly short-term rates… say, by 150 basis points." (February 4, 1977, testimony, in Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee, 1977a, p. 138.) Thus, in addition to supporting incomes policies, Tobin supported the demand policies that produced the mid-1970s peak in inflation, and wanted a monetary policy even looser than that which produced the second peak of inflation in 1980.
For Tobin, the contribution that aggregate demand management could make was in securing full employment. From that perspective, demand restriction was justified when output "classical demand-pull inflation" had been a problem over the second half of the 1960s, but he argued that the situation had changed, and that inflation now reflected "the militant desire of union members" for wage increases. This, he said, vindicated the "increasing emphasis on this new disease of 'cost-push' or 'sellers' inflation'" that he had put in his writings. Samuelson continued, "What can be done about cost-push inflation…? What is needed is some kind of a successful 'incomes policy'…" Samuelson argued that incomes policy would leave demand management free to produce full employment without wage pressure. (Newsweek, December 28, 1970 : see Samuelson, 1970 In his October 4, 1971, column, Samuelson said that President Nixon's New Economic Policy was necessary, and that the year-to-end-1972 inflation rate would be 1% less than otherwise as a consequence of the introduction of wage/price controls (Samuelson, 1971 
Friedman and modern monetary policy
The preceding discussion has established that: Committee who was most sympathetic to monetarist views during the 1970s noted that "the
According to McCallum (1986, p. 10) , Ackley (1961) was "the standard, graduate macro text of the 1960s."
implication is that monetary policy should be formulated with an eye toward controlling inflation" (Francis, 1974, p. 7) . This contribution of monetarism is borne out by the Woodford (2007) and Krugman (1999) quotations given in Section 1, and by the analysis of Mishkin (2007). Friedman (1958, p. 183) had noted that once inflation becomes anticipated, "interest rates will rise to allow for the price rise." The danger of failing to distinguish between real and nominal interest rates, and so treating low nominal rates as synonymous with easy money and high nominal rates as tight money, was a theme Friedman consistently emphasized, notably in Friedman (1968) . As Friedman (1975, p. 176) Most of the economic theory that I know says that if you want to look at the real bite of interest rates, you also adjust for inflation. And interest rates adjusted for inflation are not high at all. I think that is the sense [in which] we are not very tight. In fact, we have had negative real rates of interest on Treasury bills, for example, for over two years. This is in contrast with periods in the early '60s and most of the '50s when real rates of interest not only were not negative, but they were positive. I don't see how we can deal effectively, when we are at full employment, with accelerating inflation, and still have substantially negative real rates of interest. So it does not bother me to have interest rates go up; I think they should go up. If they don't go up, I think we are simply guaranteeing more rapid rates of inflation, which will then guarantee, in turn, higher interest rates. King and Wolman, 1996; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Woodford, 2003) . Matthews, claimed in 1982 that none of the participants at a macroeconomic conference believed that appreciable costs of inflation came via the relative-price-distortion channel, and that he could not find anyone willing to provide a paper for the conference that argued that this was an empirically important channel (Matthews, 1982, p. 11 (Ando et al, 1963, pp. 5−6) . As early as 1979, an undergraduate textbook specifically identified with monetarists the view that U.S. output gap estimates were unreliable (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1979, pp. 333−334) .
Additional contributions by Friedman to monetary economics
(e) Benefits of flexible exchange rates. One of Krugman's first papers, Dornbusch and Krugman (1976) , was on the subject of floating exchange rates. The opening page of Dornbusch and
Their narrow conception of the interest-elastic component of aggregate demand supports the characterization of Keynesian economics in Friedman (1972a) and Bordo and Schwartz (2004 that a "firm squeeze on the availability of credit can be applied… with a dozen telephone calls to commercial bankers." He argued that this "jawboning approach" could create a "pinch on availability without… interest rates anywhere near their present level." (March 10, 1980, testimony, in Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, 1980, pp. 53, 80 .) Paul Samuelson (1980) argued that with "direct limitations on borrowing, any desired slowdown in overall activity could have been contrived with interest rates not having to peak so high." Friedman (1960) rejected the use of credit controls, arguing that open market operations were an unambiguously superior policy tool. Friedman and Schwartz (1970, p. 145) suggested that direct controls on banks were ineffective, as they promoted growth in financial intermediaries not subject to the regulations. Open market operations did not have this difficulty (g) Permanent income and the allocation of consumption across periods. Friedman's (1957) work on the consumption function is often interpreted as a contribution to macroeconomics but not to monetary economics. Krugman follows this interpretation, treating the permanent income hypothesis separately from Friedman's work on monetary policy. This treatment does make
sense from the perspective of the traditional literature on consumption. That literature often treated the competition between the permanent-income and traditional Keynesian hypotheses as bearing on the choice of income concept for studying consumption in partial equilibrium.
Accordingly, the hypotheses were often presented as attempts to rationalize scatter plots of consumption data against income data.
From the perspective of modeling today, however, placing the permanent income theory outside monetary economics is less justifiable. When interest rates are not treated as constant, the permanent income theory is valuable not just in accounting for consumption/income patterns, but in describing the transmission of monetary policy. Friedman's (1957, p. 221) notion that "consumption is determined by longer-range income considerations" provides a useful way of understanding how consumption and aggregate demand respond to monetary policy. The permanent income theory can be regarded as a description of the consumer's inclination to smooth consumption across periods, a property of modern models highlighted by Hall (1978) and Lucas (1988) , and inherited by New Keynesian macroeconomics. At the same time, real interest-rate changes-abstracted from in Hall (1978) but not in the New Keynesian literatureare among the factors that will induce consumers to deviate from a smooth pattern; for example, they will delay consumption from today to tomorrow in response to a temporary increase in short-term real interest rates. 25 Friedman's key insights about intertemporal substitution-the allocation of consumption over time given an intertemporal budget constraint-are therefore an essential element in thinking about the reaction of consumption to interest-rate changes. 26 The characterization of consumers' problems as dynamic makes it natural to view the consumption choice as an intertemporal decision analogous to the decisions governing other private expenditure categories, with the result that "monetary disturbances will produce systematic patterns in the reaction of such components of output as construction, other investment, consumption, and so on." Friedman (1957, p. 221) himself noted that in addition to being a function of permanent income, consumption "depends on other variables, such as the interest rate." 26 This point was stressed by King and Wolman (1996) . 27 Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 620) .
The influence of monetarism on Krugman
Krugman is not a specialist in monetary economics. His lack of appreciation of the contributions of monetarism may partly reflect the fact that many monetarist ideas were already being incorporated by moderate Keynesians into their analysis by the time Krugman became active in economics. This possibility is brought out by studying a 1970s textbook that Krugman regards highly, Dornbusch and Fischer (1978) . Krugman has recently stated (Krugman, 2007d) :
The key thing is that good Keynesianism, as embodied even in undergrad textbooks of the time, was perfectly OK: Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978 edition, offered a description of what disinflation would look like that matches the experience of the '80s reasonably well, and the textbook does not seem all that dated even now.
We have no disagreement with Krugman on the merits of the Dornbusch-Fischer textbook. But it is misleading simply to label its analysis as "good Keynesianism." A major reason why Dornbusch and Fischer (1978) "does not seem all that dated even now" is because it incorporates many monetarist ideas. Indeed, Dornbusch and Fisher (1978, p. 520) 
observe,
Much of the analysis of this book would, a few years ago, have been considered monetarist. Dornbusch and Fischer (1978, p. 521 ) go on to acknowledge Friedman's influence on monetary economics far more accurately and fairly than Krugman did:
The forceful and persuasive way in which Friedman has emphasized the role of money has changed the views of most economists on the importance of monetary policy.
Explaining Krugman's view of modern monetary policy
How could It is worth reviewing the reasons that led Friedman to adopt these positions.
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Historically, major mistakes in monetary policy occurred in periods when central banks associated low nominal rates with easy policy, ignoring the signal-coming from a stagnant or declining money stock-that monetary policy was tight; or when they interpreted a high nominal rate as implying tight monetary policy, even when rapid money growth and high inflation suggested the opposite. In addition, the use of the nominal interest rate as an instrument could lead to situations where the rate was pegged even though macroeconomic stabilization required a changing interest rate. In evaluating Friedman's position, Dornbusch and Fischer (1978, p. 517) observed: "Each of these arguments on the dangers of conducting monetary policy by reference to nominal interest rates is important." The arguments led to Friedman's preference for a monetary base instrument-with the aim of constant growth in the money stock (M2) 29 -over an interest-rate instrument. Friedman's recommendations thus comprised both a change in target (toward constant growth in money) and a change in instrument (toward the use of the monetary base, or, in some presentations, total reserves).
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But these policy positions were never the central core of monetarist doctrine. Indeed, in listing the basic propositions of monetarism, Friedman (1970b) did not include the constantmoney-growth rule or the base-instrument prescriptions. Instead, monetarist propositions were defined as propositions about the structure of the economy and the effects of monetary policy. Friedman (1983, p. 4 ) went on to note that while he favored a constant money growth rule, "some monetarists favor varying the rate of growth in accordance with one or another rule." He subsequently observed:
Historically, monetarist policy has become associated with a particular prescription-slow, steady monetary growth. That is not a necessary implication of monetarist theory. A believer in monetarist theory still can favor an activist monetary policy as a way to offset other changes in the economy… (Friedman, 1984, p. 3.) -
28 See e.g. Friedman (1960 Friedman ( , 1968 Friedman ( , 1970b . 29 Friedman and Schwartz (1963a) used a monetary aggregate that included currency, demand and time deposits, and so was similar to (though narrower in definition than) the monetary aggregate now defined officially as M2. 30 Friedman's desire that monetary authorities use a monetary quantity as an instrument was conceptually distinct from his advocacy of monetary targeting. Advocacy of an M2 target is not in itself a rejection of the interest rate as an instrument, since the interest rate in principle could be varied so as to hit the M2 target.
But he added:
So far as monetarist theory is concerned, it will continue to be the bread and butter of monetary economics. (Friedman, 1984, p. 4.) Both New Keynesian economics and modern monetary policy practice can be thought of as indeed accepting monetarist theory as "the bread and butter of monetary economics." The Friedman policy prescriptions of constant money growth and a base instrument have been rejected, but many core theoretical and empirical propositions of monetarism have been incorporated into the mainstream. Two central monetarist propositions-the nominal rate/real rate distinction; and the need for inflation control to be assigned to monetary policy-now guide the formulation of interest-rate policy by central banks in a way that they did not in the 1970s.
Consequently, the recommendation that central banks move to a quantity instrument has fallen by the wayside, with monetary policy successes reducing the case for this reform.
Friedman understood that interest-rate instrument rules could in principle deliver stable inflation, and that the choice between the interest rate and the monetary base as an instrument was consequently a tactical, not a strategic, matter. 31 But actual experience with interest-rate rules in most countries up to the late 1970s was discouraging. With policymakers apparently unwilling or unable to make the interest-rate decisions needed to restore price stability, a base instrument rule had merits as an automatic means of delivering the needed movements in interest rates. To repeat, the switch in many countries after the late 1970s to more stabilizing interestrate rules did not come by accident, but arose from acceptance of core monetarist propositions.
The foundation of that regime change, and of interest-rate decisions today, is acceptance of Friedman's (1980a) position, noted earlier, that "monetary restraint is a sufficient condition for controlling inflation."
Financial innovations, such as sweeps programs and interest payments on money, have loosened the relationship between many monetary aggregates and nominal GDP. With some monetary aggregates (e.g., M1 in the United States) affected more seriously by innovation than others, defining money has become a more difficult empirical task. In light of these developments, the most durable aspects of monetarist theory are those that hold even in
See, for example, Friedman (1980b 
Evidence contradicting claims for a liquidity trap in the United States in the 1930s
and in Japan in the 1990s
United States
As Friedman and Schwartz (1963b, p. 52) should not detract from the fact that monetary policy was already highly restrictive in 1928−30.
Krugman claims that Friedman's AEA Presidential Address (Friedman, 1968) engaged in crude assertion by stating that the Federal Reserve "permitted a sharp reduction in the monetary base."
In fact, the monetary base declined over 5 percent from April 1928 to October 1930 (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963a, pp. 290, 340-342, and 803) . It was this initial period of monetary restriction that Friedman was referring to in his AEA Presidential Address. Moreover, he was not suddenly emphasizing a theme that had not been raised by himself and Schwartz in previous accounts; the accounts of the Great Contraction in Schwartz (1963a, 1963b) noted the monetary tightness of the 1920s, and Friedman (1962, p. 46) 
The name, liquidity trap, was originated by Dennis Robertson (see, for example, Robertson, 1940 ); Keynes did not name the concept. Hawtrey's (1932) "credit deadlock" concept closely overlaps with the vision of monetary policy ineffectiveness seen in the liquidity trap scenario; see Laidler (2007) . 33 Friedman (1972a) documented the preponderance of references in the General Theory to the liquidity trap.
borrowing was assumed to be for productive purposes, i.e., to underpin projects that expanded the stock of productive capital. Over and above their adherence to this flawed doctrine, opponents of expansive monetary policy operations believed that existing low nominal interest rates were evidence that monetary ease had already been achieved. This perspective was distinct from the liquidity trap view. In a liquidity trap, further monetary expansion is ineffective at adding to any economic activity; while the Federal Reserve position was that monetary policy had been made sufficiently expansive for productive investment to proceed, and that additional ease, while possible, was undesirable because it would stimulate speculative activity.
To make the case that the liquidity trap idea is relevant for understanding the 1930s, its might not have occurred (see Meltzer, 2003, pp. 372−373 As Bernanke (2002) noted, banking panics prior to the creation of the Federal Reserve had had a circuit-breaker, because of the convention for clearinghouse associations to make arrangements that supported banks that were basically sound but suffering from deposit runs.
The Federal Reserve's existence was thought to have made such arrangements redundant: private institutions no longer had to serve as surrogate central banks (see Bernanke, 1983, pp. 259−260; Timberlake, 1984 Just as banks all around the country were closing, the Fed raised the discount rate; that's the rate they charge for loans to banks. Bank failures consequently increased spectacularly. We might have had an economic downturn in the thirties anyway, but in the absence of the Federal Reserve System-with its enormous power to make a bad situation worse-it wouldn't have
For his address in Friedman (1968) , where he referred to the "highly deflationary policies" of the Federal Reserve in the Great Contraction. 35 Incidentally, Krugman's brings this quotation into his essay by writing, "By 1976 Friedman was telling readers of Newsweek that "the elementary truth is that the Great Depression was produced by government mismanagement,'…" This is another inaccuracy in Krugman's essay, for the quoted passage (from Friedman, 1976b) did not appear in Newsweek. 36 Norman (1973) .
been anything like the scale we experienced.
In this interview, Friedman clearly characterized the problem as Federal Reserve failure to support commercial banks. That was the task the Federal Reserve was assigned when it was created, and it did not exercise that function. Friedman did not imply-as Krugman (2007a) suggests-that "the Depression wouldn't have happened if only the government had kept out of the way." Furthermore, Friedman's emphasis on the discount-rate episode-a deflationary action by the Federal Reserve that compounded its inaction on the banking collapse-agrees with the Monetary History and with Bernanke's retrospective.
Another journalistic account by Friedman of the Great Contraction appeared in the San
Francisco Chronicle in 1979 (Friedman, 1979) . Again, the mismanagement attributed to the government is clearly identified as failure of the Federal Reserve to support the private banking system. In his 1979 article, Friedman observed:
The Great Depression was produced by a failure of government, by a failure of monetary policy. It was produced by a failure of the Federal Reserve System to act in accordance with the intentions of those who established it….
[I]t was in the management of this fundamental function of government that government failed and produced the Great Depression. Krugman's (2007a) discussion takes for granted that expansion of the aggregate monetary base implies easy policy. Apparently, only the aggregate of the base should be used for studying policy. That is a strange dictum. The aggregate matters, but there is no rule prohibiting analysis of the separate components. There can be no dispute that how the base is split up between its currency and reserves components has implications for commercial banks' ---------------------------------------ability to increase their loans and investments (and thus create deposits). Moreover, monetary policy actions can ensure an increase in bank reserves. True, the division of the level of the monetary base between currency and reserves is ultimately a private sector decision. It is, however, generally not the case that the way an increase in the monetary base is split between currency and reserves is independent of monetary policy. For the circumstances that prevailed in the 1930s we can be confident that more expansionary open market operations would have prevented the reserves portion of the base from declining. The fundamental reason for this is that the Federal Reserve is always able to expand its total balance sheet at a sufficient rate so that bulges in currency demand do not translate into drains on bank reserves and so into macroeconomic instability.
Nominal interest rates were very low in the 1930s, but such an environment does not prevent expansion of the money supply from being an effective means of stimulating aggregate demand. How does monetary expansion remain effective for stimulating demand? The monetarist transmission mechanism (described, for example, in Schwartz, 1963b, or Meltzer, 2003) offers an answer. The bringing of the short-term nominal interest rate to zero, or near zero, does not imply that the scope for monetary expansion to stimulate the economy has been exhausted. Other asset prices that matter for aggregate demand will be bid up (and corresponding implied yields on the assets lowered) by the increase in the money stock and the use of the extra money to purchase assets. Even when the nominal rate is zero, there are a great number of asset prices susceptible to influence by monetary policy.
Japan
Japan's experience after its stock market and property price collapse in the early 1990s was a fall in money market rates to less than 1 percent. Here too Krugman interprets the low level of market rates as proof of a liquidity trap. He takes for granted that Japan's experience is a refutation of the Friedman-Schwartz position on monetary policy's scope to stimulate the economy. He ignores the proposals for monetary expansion in Japan made by Friedman (1997) and other monetarists during the 1990s.
---------------------------------------
38 See Orphanides (2004) for comparisons of Japan's experience in the 1990s with the conditions in the United States in the 1930s. Orphanides concludes that neither period can be described using the liquidity trap scenario.
Japan was confronted with a banking system in disarray and an unprecedented level of government debt, in addition to recessionary conditions and, eventually, a falling price level.
Ambivalence was prevalent about what policy to pursue, with the Bank of Japan maintaining well into the late 1990s that low nominal interest rates were proof that it was following an easy policy. Eventually a more affirmative policy was introduced, with the "quantitative easing"
program undertaken by the Japanese monetary authorities from 2001. This policy can be criticized for having been begun too late and for being too opaque compared to alternative programs of sustained monetary expansion. But in retrospect it appears that the economy did respond to the quantitative easing, which involved increases in the monetary base and deliberate injections of reserves into the banking system. As discussed by Ugai (2007) , the empirical evidence suggests that the Bank of Japan's operations were successful in stimulating aggregate demand via the term structure and other channels. Monetary policy revived the economy and contradicted the picture of ineffective monetary policy painted by the liquidity trap story.
The monetary stimulus from 2001 is a more plausible explanation for Japan's economic recovery than Krugman's (2007a) suggestion that technological innovation stimulated a revival of investment in Japan. A technological innovation by itself would stimulate aggregate supply but not aggregate demand, and so would be a source of deflation and a worsening output gap.
Monetary expansion created the conditions for nominal aggregate demand to expand and so allowed a sustained increase in real aggregate demand.
Concluding remarks
Paul Krugman is a respected trade theorist. But he does not speak authoritatively on subjects on which he has no expertise. Monetary economics is not his field of expertise.
Krugman's research background does not qualify him as an authority on Milton Friedman's work. Krugman's scholarly publications rarely mentioned Friedman and, when they did, they acknowledged the contributions of Friedman and monetarism in a way that contradicts his (2007a) essay on Friedman. Friedman's reputation is intact despite Krugman's deplorable efforts to denigrate him and his contributions.
